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Allusive reference and other-oriented stance in an affinal avoidance register 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes the social-relational dynamics of in-law name avoidance in Datooga, a 
Nilotic language spoken in Tanzania. Datooga women avoid referring to their senior affines by 
birth name, while also avoiding words that ‘allusively’ refer to these in-laws by sharing lexical or 
phonetic material with their names. These acts of name avoidance are conceptualized here in 
terms of stance: each instance of avoidance orients the speaker towards her affinal kin. The 
analysis of this unusual phenomenon emphasizes how speakers construct social relations in 
discourse not only with immediate speech participants but also with absent others, across time 
and space. 
 
1. Introduction  
Research on language and social relations overwhelmingly focuses on the relationship between 
speaker and addressee, leaving the third classic speech participant role of “other” (Irvine 1996) 
undertheorized in comparison. The speaker–addressee relationship, explored through concepts 
such as politeness, facework, alignment, and affiliation, is of constant and more conspicuous 
relevance to the analysis of language and social organization, but speakers also index 
relationships with third parties in their talk. Striking examples of how speakers orient to 
nonpresent others come from the affinal avoidance registers of sub-Saharan Africa. Among the 
Datooga of Tanzania, for instance, women practice extensive linguistic avoidance with respect to 
usually absent and in some cases long dead in-law relations, avoiding not only their names but 
also lexically related and similar-sounding words. This paper discusses how, through the 
avoidance of names as well as seemingly ordinary words, Datooga women position themselves 
relative to third parties. In exploring this relational orientation between speakers and third 
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persons, I emphasize how language use is sensitive to social relations beyond those of the 
immediate speech event. 
One of the principal ways in which speakers attend to their relationships with third persons 
in discourse is by means of person reference (Murphy 1988, Enfield & Stivers 2007), e.g., the 
use of names, kinship terms, or person descriptions, the latter perhaps involving a person’s 
profession (“the doctor”), a personal characteristic (“the guy with the big hair”), or some 
attitudinal term (“that idiot”). In-law name avoidance in Datooga is usefully understood in terms 
of person reference, though it presents a rather elaborate manifestation of it. Datooga avoidance 
unambiguously concerns person reference where it involves women avoiding their senior in-
laws’ names and referring to them with alternative expressions. Yet women also avoid many 
words that do not refer to individuals, but to inanimate objects or actions, like ‘pot’ or ‘knife’ or 
‘hit,’ on account of the lexical and/or phonetic resemblance these words bear to taboo names. 
Here I argue that these more elaborate cases of avoidance also involve person reference, and I do 
so by introducing the concept of allusive reference. Allusive reference is an ideologically-
mediated semiotic relationship whereby a sign indirectly points to a person by virtue of a 
conventionalized association between that sign and the person’s name, as agreed upon in a given 
community of practice. This concept, explained in section 3, makes it possible to describe all 
aspects of Datooga avoidance as invoking third-person referents (or allusive referents).  
After showing how Datooga avoidance always involves some third-person referent, I then 
frame avoidance in terms of stance; specifically, stances taken towards third persons. In section 
4, I combine Haviland’s (2007) concept of triangularity in person reference with Du Bois’ (2007) 
stance triangle to model what I call “other-oriented stance,” intended to capture the dynamics of 
how speakers orient to nonpresent others in discourse. Drawing on Stasch’s (2003) work on 
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Korowai avoidance, I argue that in Datooga, women’s stances of avoidance with respect to their 
in-law relations index not only their social remove from these individuals but also their social 
obligation to them, in that women continually invoke these relationships and their own relative 
deferential positions through the habitual practice of word avoidance. While the main focus is on 
the speaker–referent axis of the stance triangle, I point, in section 4.2, to the complexity of the 
social and interactional effects of affinal name avoidance, discussing how avoidance 
simultaneously shapes relationships between speakers and addressees. The concluding remarks 
tie in Agha’s (2005) observations about the way in which particular stances, repeated over and 
over like those of avoidance, can also crystallize into indexes of personhood.  
Datooga belongs to the Nilotic language family and is spoken by semi-nomadic agro-
pastoralists spread across northern and central Tanzania. Within Datooga, there are numerous 
ethnic subgroupings, many of which speak distinctive dialects of the language. Data in this paper 
are taken from recordings of naturally-occurring conversation and interviews in the Gisamjanga 
and Barabaiga dialects. Data was collected in Mbulu District, Tanzania between 2012 and early 
2015. Avoidance words in the examples are indicated in bold. 
 
2. The Datooga avoidance register  
In traditional Datooga society, married women show respect to their senior in-laws by avoiding 
not only their names but also the lexical items from which the names derive, as well as similar-
sounding words.  This is an example of what Fleming (2014:146) has called “referentially based 
avoidance registers,” which include the well-known case of hlonipha in several Nguni languages 
of Southern Africa (Kunene 1958, Finlayson 1982, Luthuli 2007), and the affinal avoidance 
registers of Highland East Cushitic languages of Ethiopia (Treis 2005) (and see other examples 
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listed in Fleming (2014:126)). As in these other cases, Datooga-speaking women have developed 
a highly conventionalized avoidance vocabulary to replace taboo words. For example, a woman 
whose mother-in-law is called Údá-mánàng’ (‘FEM-small’) will avoid this name, regardless of its 
bearer, along with the adjective mánàng’ ‘small,’ from which the name derives. She will also 
avoid words considered to sound similar, e.g., mànánda ‘waist,’ which shares the same initial 
CVC sequence as the name.1,2 A conventional alternative for the ordinary adjective mánàng’ is 
básàk, an avoidance-specific word of unknown origin. This woman could thus refer to her 
mother-in-law as Údábásàk and would describe small objects as básàk rather than mánàng’. To 
replace mànánda ‘waist,’ she could use the conventionalized lexical substitution bùgústa 
‘middle.’ This practice of linguistic avoidance is known in Datooga as gíing’áwêakshòoda, a 
nominalization of the verb ng’awaas ‘avoid (in speech).’ Additional examples of Datooga words 
with their avoidance equivalents are given in Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here.]  
 
Datooga society is patrilocal, and women begin practicing gíing’áwêakshòoda in earnest 
after their wedding, a ceremony which usually takes place several months after they have joined 
their husband’s household.3 Barabaiga and Gisamjanga women avoid up to three ascending 
generations of in-laws, male and female, though the exact set of avoided relatives varies from 
household to household. Father-in-law is the central and prototypical target of avoidance in the 
sense that women’s metapragmatic discussions of avoidance revolve around this kinship 
category, unless explicitly asked about other avoided relations. Father-in-law is associated with 
various nonlinguistic prohibitions, too, including physical contact, eye contact, contact with his 
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belongings, and, in the initial stages of marriage, being seen at all. Linguistic avoidance is thus 
one aspect of a cross-modal array of iconic-indexical signs of the affinal avoidance relationship.  
Women are expected to practice avoidance at all times, regardless of the identity of 
addressee or the situational context, the only exception being during childbirth, when midwives 
encourage women to call out taboo names. Recordings of naturally-occurring speech in a small 
number of Datooga households show that women do not avoid all taboo words with absolute 
consistency in practice, but speakers’ descriptions of avoidance hold this to be the case. The 
following example, taken from a recording of conversation, illustrates how linguistic avoidance 
operates at the utterance level:  
 
(1) á-méewà  jéebú  géani  hàshàs-án-ga 
 IMP.SG-loosen.IS  child.DEM.PROX get.IMP  light-FS-MR 
 ‘Help this child; get him some water’ [lit. ‘loosen this child; get him some lightnesses’] 
 
In (1), the speaker calls to her daughter-in-law in the kitchen to bring her child some water. She 
avoids the verb wead ‘help’ on account of its phonetic similarity to the name of her husband’s 
paternal aunt’s son Wéadòoda. Instead, she uses the conventional lexical substitution meew, 
meaning ‘loosen’ in ordinary usage. She also avoids the word béega ‘water’ and uses the form 
hàshàsánga instead, derived from hàshàs ‘light (adj.).’ Since these avoidance words belong to 
the family dialect (or ‘familect’ (Crystal 2009), so to speak), her interlocutors have no trouble 
understanding her and the child is given water. While it is only female, married members of the 
household who actively use these words, all household members are familiar with them.  
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For a detailed linguistic description of the Datooga avoidance register, and more 
ethnographic background, see Author (2015). The rest of this paper is concerned with the social-
relational effects achieved by the speaker when she utters the avoidance words in example (1), 
particularly in relation to the referents of the names that motivate her avoidance. 
 
3. Direct and allusive person reference in Datooga 
Affinal name avoidance practices in Datooga are driven by relational concerns about how one 
should refer to certain third persons. In some cases, this may seem counter-intuitive, since, as we 
just saw with the example of ‘water’ in (1) above, words associated with affinal avoidance often 
refer to inanimate objects. To demonstrate how avoidance words always have to do with third-
person referents, I will introduce the concept of “allusive reference,” an ideologically-mediated 
semiotic relationship whereby certain words point to personal names through allusion or through 
a conventionalized kind of sound symbolism. With this concept to hand, we are then able to say 
that Datooga women avoid referring to or allusively referring to their senior in-laws by birth 
name. 
In his work on the typology of affinal avoidance registers, Fleming (2014:146) has 
identified hlonipha and related practices (under which Datooga avoidance falls) as “referentially 
based avoidance registers,” contrasting this with “interactionally based avoidance registers” as 
found in Australia (e.g., Dixon 1971). Referentially based avoidance is motivated by sensitivities 
surrounding names on account of their “inherent referentiality” (Fleming 2011:143), their ability 
to always pick out a specific referent, while interactionally based avoidance is triggered by the 
identity of particular copresent interactional participant(s). While gíing’áwêakshòoda is 
primarily motivated by problems with names and reference, interactional concerns are not 
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irrelevant to its use, and I discuss speaker–addressee relational dynamics of avoidance in section 
4.2.  
In what sense is linguistic avoidance in Datooga oriented toward third-person referents? 
One aspect of the practice, the avoidance of in-laws’ birth names, is referent-oriented in an 
obvious way: when women make reference to a senior in-law, they choose to use a 
conventionalized ‘avoidance’ name instead of that person’s birth name. For example, in the 
following utterance, a young woman refers to one of her male in-laws with the conventionalized 
gíing’áwêakshòoda form of his name, Gídáwápta, rather than his birth name Gídámúlda. The 
birth name is derived from the verb mul ‘hide, abscond,’ and the verb wap, a close synonym, is 
the conventionalized avoidance replacement for mul. (The example comes from a researcher-led 
discussion about avoided names and related words.) 
 
(2) m-òo-wíinyí  Gídáwápta  íiyá?   
 NEG-3-smell.like.IS  PSN  mother  
 ‘Doesn’t that sound like Gidawapta, mother?’ 
 
In choosing to use the name Gídáwápta rather than Gídámúlda, the speaker in (2) refers to this 
absent third party in a manner that is metapragmatically associated with gíing’áwêakshòoda and 
in turn with respectfulness. Conventional lexical substitutes of taboo words, such as wap, 
function as nonreferential indexicals—indexing acts of avoidance and thus respect—but note that 
they can also take on the referential indexical properties of taboo names when employed to make 
reference to in-law relations (often in combination with name morphology, e.g., gídá- ‘masculine 
name prefix’).  
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Women don’t necessarily use gíing’áwêakshòoda whenever they need to refer to their 
senior in-laws, though: they also frequently use their in-laws’ ‘domestic’ names in place of their 
birth names, as in example (3) below. The domestic name is a personal name that children use to 
refer to their parents and other adults, and which other members of the household, neighbors, and 
visitors typically use as well. Women acquire their domestic name upon marriage, while men can 
be given one at any time from childhood onwards, whenever it is felt to be necessary.7 In (3), a 
young woman suggests to her mother-in-law’s sister, whose domestic name is Mùdúuláan, that 
she call her father-in-law in from outside, since there is a small social gathering taking place 
inside. The speaker refers to her father-in-law by his domestic name, Jáajìida, rather than the 
gíing’áwêakshòoda equivalent of his birth name. (The father-in-law, in turn, would typically 
refer to his daughter-in-law with her domestic name.) 
 
(3) àndákkèa  m-ú-gùur-síiní  Jáajìida  Mùdúuláan?    
 NEG.Q  NEG-2SG-call-TERM.CP.IS  PSN  PSN   
 ‘Why don’t you call Jaajiida over, Muduulaan?’ 
 
Through her choice to use the form Jáajìida, the daughter-in-law treats the referent, her father-
in-law, with an appropriate level of respect, but does not index a conspicuous act of in-law 
avoidance; many different categories of people, including his wives and grown-up children, use 
the name Jáajìida to refer to this man. In both (2) and (3), the speakers avoid the referents’ birth 
names, but only in (2) is the referent a target of avoidance in the sense of avoidance as 
enregistered practice with its attendant indexical meanings. 
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 While the instance of gíing’áwêakshòoda in (2) is a clear example of a third-person 
referent as target of avoidance, other aspects of the phenomenon less obviously concern third-
person referents, such as when women avoid the lexical item from which a taboo name derives. 
For example, in the following utterance, made by a woman cutting up beef in the company of 
several other women, there is no explicit reference to a third person: 
 
(4) g-àj-ée-géanu  gèesh-tá  nyábùul-da  àk-k-í-dàbí  gìli    
 AFF-FUT-1PL-take.CP  leg-UR cow-UR  SEQ-AFF-2SG-beat.IS  thing    
 ‘You take the cow’s leg and then you hit it with this thing…’ 
 
To understand that the speaker in (4) is orienting to a third person, one must know that 
nyábùulda ‘cow’ is an avoidance term used in place of the ordinary word déeda ‘cow’ and that 
one of the speaker’s in-law relations is called Dúu-dée ‘black-cow.’8 Equipped with this 
knowledge, we can observe that when the speaker chooses to utter the word nyábùulda instead of 
déeda, she indexes her relationship with a nonpresent other, a man called Dúudée, by avoiding a 
word that sounds like his name. However, the referent of the avoidance word is of course ‘cow’ 
and not Dúudée himself, which poses a problem for the claim that avoidance is referent-based: 
the referent, the cow, is not the focus of avoidance, but rather the in-law relation named Dúudée. 
Fleming (2014:120) writes that, “even where the linguistic form does not specifically refer to the 
focus of avoidance, as with a homophone, the social index functions on analogy to the 
referentially based pattern,” thus indexing the in-law as the focus of avoidance. However, in a 
footnote he adds that it is “ultimately untenable to call this referent-focused,” since the avoidance 
forms “in no way refer to the taboo relation” (Fleming 2014:148). Although it is true that 
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Dúudée is not directly referred to in (4), the speaker avoids uttering this word because for her to 
say déeda would bring about a similar pragmatic effect to saying the name Dúudée, as a result of 
a culture-internal, conventionalized association between names and their component lexemes. In 
this sense, Dúudée is an allusive referent of the word déeda.  
 Allusive reference is an indirect sign–object relationship that holds between a sign A and 
an object B, where sign A, in addition to standing for some object A, points to another sign B, 
which in turn stands for object B. For example, the word form ng’ádìida (sign A) stands for the 
object LION (object A) for all Datooga speakers. For certain Datooga communities of practice, 
the word ng’ádìida also points to the name Gídá-ng’ádìida ‘MSC-lion’ (sign B): there is a 
conventionalized association between these two words such that, for some women, uttering 
ng’ádìida is akin to uttering the name Gídáng’ádìida (i.e., both violate a taboo). This association 
is based on shared lexical material: the name is derived from the noun. The name Gídáng’ádìida 
is itself a sign that stands for a specific person (object B). Thus, the linguistic sign ng’ádìida also 
points to this individual through allusion, a relationship mediated by lexical overlap between two 
signs. On the basis of this indirect semiotic link, the word ng’ádìida allusively refers to the 
person called Gídáng’ádìida.  
I have diagrammed this relationship in Figure 1, using Enfield’s (2013) representation of 
the semiotic process. The diagram represents how a sign (SA) can allusively refer to an object 
(OB) in addition to the one that it directly refers to (OA). This relationship is indicated by the red 
pathway from sign A to sign B and then to the latter sign’s denotational object. The first link in 
this relationship—that one sign points to another sign—is lexically constituted for Datooga: the 
two signs share lexical material. 
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[Insert Figure 1 here.] 
 
As the note beside the second A(gent) in Figure 1 points out, there is a restricted set of people for 
whom the sign ng’ádìida would allusively refer to the person Gídáng’ádìida in the context of 
ordinary speech: only those who are aware that the speaker avoids this particular name. Such 
people, upon hearing a woman uttering ng’ádìida (rather than its conventionalized alternative 
form sêang’da), might then pick up on the allusive reference to Gídáng’ádìida. A possible 
I(nterpretant), i.e., the reaction of the agent to the sign, could be an expression of shock or 
surprise that the speaker had broken the name taboo. (We see a report of a taboo violation in 
Extract 3, below, where a woman claims she was shocked by hearing a woman utter her father-
in-law’s name.) For interlocutors who are not familiar with the names of a woman’s affinal kin, 
these subtle relationships between words and names will go unnoticed. Nonetheless, whether or 
not a person knows of a particular Gídáng’ádìida and the consequent tabooing of ng’ádìida 
‘lion’ among his junior female in-laws, Datooga are aware of the general linguistic relationship 
that holds between the word ng’ádìida and name Gídáng’ádìida. 
The metalinguistic association that Datooga make between a name and its component 
lexeme—i.e. between SA and SB in Figure 1—is evident in how speakers use the same avoidance 
form to replace a particular lexeme and to create a gíing’áwêakshòoda “version” of a name 
containing that lexeme, e.g., ng’ádìida is conventionally replaced with sêang’da (an avoidance-
specific form of unknown origin) and the name Gídáng’ádìida becomes Gídásêang’da.9 Further, 
Datooga speakers have a metapragmatic term for the relationship indicated with the dotted red 
line between the two signs: they use the word wiiny ‘smell like’ to describe the way in which a 
word resembles a name. I interpret this usage in terms of traces: a word contains a trace of, or 
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‘smells like,’ a name, such that the two are indexically connected, like a person and their 
footprint. The verb wiiny is used in other contexts to talk about olfactory traces—a calabash 
smelling of the sour milk that it had contained earlier, a person’s clothes smelling of smoke after 
proximity to fire. Ultimately, I think that the relevant trace is between a word and a person, 
rather than just their name, but this expression, of words smelling like names, is getting at the 
same idea that my term ‘allusive reference’ is intended to convey: of an indirect link between 
words and names, mediated by their material substance.10 
My claim so far, then, is that in Datooga certain words make allusive reference to 
individuals by pointing to another sign (a name) that directly denotes that individual. Women 
avoid both the birth names of their senior in-laws and words that make allusive reference to them 
by association with their birth names. There is a third type of avoidance that has not yet been 
discussed: the avoidance of near-homophones of birth names. For example, the verb root ng’ad 
‘cut; strike’ might be avoided on account of the name Gídáng’ádìida. The relationship between 
these two word forms is based not on shared lexical material, as with ng’ádìida and 
Gídáng’ádìida, but on shared phonetic material: the sound sequence ng’ad. While this word-
name relationship works on the phonetic rather than lexical level, it, too, involves a 
metalinguistic judgement of similarity which leads Datooga speakers to interpret an ordinary 
word as indirectly referring to a taboo in-law. As such, I consider this sign–sign relationship as a 
kind of allusive reference, too.  The sign ng’ad points to another sign Gídáng’ádìida by means of 
a metalinguistic, conventionalized association whereby speakers link words to names based on 
shared CVC syllables.11 For speakers who are supposed to avoid the name Gídáng’ádìida, this 
metalinguistic association requires that ng’ad become a target of avoidance too.  
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The purpose of this section has been to show how all aspects of in-law name avoidance in 
Datooga involve person reference. While this is intuitively the case, the details of how this works 
needed some untangling. Names are straightforward person-referring expressions, but I argue 
that name roots and near-homophones of names can also allusively refer to persons in Datooga 
through metalinguistically crafted links with names, based either on shared lexical or phonetic 
material. Allusive reference refers to a culture-internal metapragmatic understanding of possible 
relationships between signs (though one that perhaps has wider application for thinking about 
punning and other kinds of wordplay). Fleming (2011:155) suggests that lexeme and near-
homophone avoidance across cultures develop diachronically out of straightforward name 
avoidance and arise from anxieties that certain words could be mistaken for certain taboo names. 
This attention to the “material substance of the sign” (Fleming, ibid.) is what motivates the 
connection between two signs, as diagrammed in Figure 1.12 As Fleming (2011:155–6) points 
out, once lexeme and near-homophone avoidance become conventionalized, a near-homophone 
need not actually be mistaken for the taboo name “to have its undesired causal effects.” 
Nonetheless, these convoluted aspects of name avoidance practices still revolve, 
diachronically and synchronically, around the problem of the name, and what it means to call 
someone by their birth name. For Datooga speakers, who have several different kinds of names 
as well as other options for referring to each other,13 using someone’s birth name gives rise to 
certain social-relational implicatures. For a woman to refer to a senior in-law by his or her birth 
name would suggest that she construes her own social status as sufficiently high relative to this 
in-law that she is entitled to use their name, i.e., is their senior or their peer. Such an act would 
be inappropriate (to say the least) in a society that values deferential behavior with respect to 
one’s senior affines, and seniors more generally. In a woman’s efforts not to refer, or even 
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allusively refer, to an in-law relation by their birth name, that person is paradoxically made 
relevant as a referent in interaction—a point to be elaborated on in the next section. 
 
4. Other-oriented stance  
The practice of gíing’áwêakshòoda revolves around the presentation of social relations in 
speech. More specifically, it hinges on concerns about how to refer to one’s in-laws, and how to 
deal with the problematic property of Datooga words, discussed in the previous section, that they 
can make allusive reference to persons while denoting something entirely different. The solution 
Datooga women have found is to avoid such words by choosing alternative lexical items. This 
practice has, over time, led to enregisterment of a special set of avoidance words, such that 
avoidance is simply a matter of selecting forms from an ‘avoidance register’ (rather than coming 
up with an idiosyncratic avoidance strategy each time). The process of enregisterment probably 
relies more on distinctions drawn between married women’s and other people’s speech (a 
second-order indexical value of avoidance language), than on speakers keeping track of taboo 
words and their avoidance counterparts.  Nonetheless, these enregistered word forms make acts 
of name avoidance conspicuous: in women’s efforts not to refer to someone by name, they, on 
some level, draw attention to that person.14 In this part of the paper, I consider in more detail 
how avoidance language mediates relationships between speakers and their senior in-laws, and 
thus reproduces aspects of Datooga social organization. As I mentioned in the introduction, work 
on interpersonal relations in sociolinguistics and pragmatics has, understandably, tended to focus 
on the ways in which language mediates relationships between copresent participants; politeness 
research, especially, concentrates on speakers and addressees. Avoidance registers like 
gíing’áwêakshòoda position speakers with respect to typically absent third parties, and as such 
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draw attention to how language use is shaped by social relations that hold beyond those of the 
immediate interaction.  
Linguists and anthropologists have relatively little theoretical apparatus available to them 
for probing how speakers orient to third parties and what is accomplished by doing so. One 
theoretical concept that does attempt to capture the speaker–other relationship is Bell’s referee 
design, though it is of limited relevance for gíing’áwêakshòoda. According to Bell (2002:147), 
“referees are third persons not usually present at an interaction but possessing such salience for a 
speaker that they influence style even in their absence”; e.g., in imagining a certain audience, a 
radio presenter might shift to a more standard accent. This definition of referees captures 
something of the ideological status of avoided individuals, in that they do influence women’s 
lexical choices in their absence. However, unlike Bell’s referee design, Datooga women are not 
emulating stylistic features associated with a particular group in order to align themselves with 
that group; they are indexing their relationship with a specific third person through conspicuous 
avoidance of his or her name. While avoidance and the phenomenon of, say, crossing (where 
speakers use language of a group to which they are not considered to belong; Rampton 1995) 
both conjure up images of others relative to which a speaker positions herself, the other is 
conjured in gíing’áwêakshòoda not by invoking the stylistic emblems of a demarcated group but 
through avoiding direct or allusive reference to an in-law relation by their birth name.  
A more useful theoretical concept for avoidance is that of stance, which has been 
mentioned in a number of other studies of person reference. Haviland (2007:226) writes that 
“person reference […] always involves the indexicalities of stance,” and Enfield (2007:119), 
finding fault with the conversation analytic idea of “default” person reference, argues that “it is 
not possible in any context to refer to persons without encoding, implying or otherwise making 
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available a stance towards social relationships that generally applies in the culture.” As 
discussed, avoidance has a complex relationship with person reference: while using an 
alternative referring expression for someone’s name is an obvious case of person reference, 
lexeme and near-homophone avoidance disguise reference not to a person but to some object, 
e.g., ‘cow’ in example (4). As I have argued, these kinds of words are avoided because they are 
understood by speakers to allusively refer to someone. The practice of gíing’áwêakshòoda is 
rooted in concerns about who gets to refer to whom in what manner, and in their elaborate 
attempts to veil reference to others, women are “encoding, implying, or otherwise making 
available a stance towards social relationships” (Enfield, ibid). In what follows, I use Du Bois’s 
stance triangle to model how interpersonal stances are realized through avoidance, and I argue 
for distinguishing a particular kind of stance category, “other-oriented stance,” which refers to 
stances speakers take towards absent third parties. In section 4.1, I then attempt to describe the 
quality of the relational indexing achieved through stances of avoidance, drawing on Agha’s 
(1993) notion of deference entitlements and Stasch’s (2003:331) ideas about “alterity and 
obligation” in Korowai in-law avoidance.  
In a paper on person reference in Tzotzil gossip, Haviland (2007:229) describes person 
reference as “inherently triangular”; that is, involving a triangular relationship between speaker, 
referent, and addressee. We can visualize this understanding of person reference by representing 
it in terms of Du Bois’ stance triangle, as shown (in slightly adapted form) in Figure 2. This 
diagram can help us model how reference (or, in our case, avoided reference) to third persons 
mediates social relationships through stance-taking. Du Bois’ stance triangle consists of three 
elements: the stance-taking subject (Subject 1), the object of the stance (Referent (person)), and 
other copresent subjects with whom the stance-taking subject may align (by virtue of the stance-
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taking; Subject 2). If we think about Datooga name avoidance in these terms, we can claim the 
following: when a Datooga woman avoids making direct or allusive reference to, say, her father-
in-law by his birth name, she takes a stance towards her father-in-law: she “assign[s] value to 
objects of interest [in this case, a person, her father-in-law], [she] position[s] social actors [in this 
case, herself] with respect to those objects […] and [she] invoke[s] presupposed systems of 
sociocultural value” (Du Bois 2007:139). More specifically, she attributes deference entitlements 
(Agha 1993) to her father-in-law, she positions herself as his junior, female affine, and in doing 
so she invokes an understood social hierarchy in which daughters-in-law are in various senses 
obligated to their senior in-laws. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here.] 
 
Du Bois’s (2007) “stance object” is, in the cases he discusses, some inanimate referent: a 
hibiscus cooler, a weekend, a location. These stances mediate interpersonal relationships insofar 
as they align or disalign speech participants through shared or diverging evaluations of the stance 
object. Of course, a stance object is very often an animate referent: a third person. One important 
difference between inanimate referents and person referents as objects of stance is the nature of 
the relationship between the stance-taker and the object. Taking a stance towards another person, 
as opposed to an inanimate referent, has potential consequences for the relationship between the 
speaker and the third person. In his discussion of the role of third parties in communication, 
Linell (2009) emphasizes the fact that third persons have agency: he defines a third party as 
someone who “thinks, says or does—or could think, say or do—something which is relevant for 
the primary parties (here-and-now).” To take this literally, the deference Datooga women show 
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or fail to show to nonpresent in-laws through their use of gíing’áwêakshòoda may be reported to 
those in-laws on a future occasion. In a more abstract sense, a speaker may simply be mindful of 
a third person’s social identity when she portrays their relationship in a particular way through 
the act of referring.  
It is the agency of a person as stance object that gives these kinds of stances—what I will 
call “other-oriented stances” in reference to the participant roles of Speaker, Addressee, and 
Other (Irvine 1996)—a different quality than stances towards inanimate objects. This is reflected 
in Figure 2 by a small change to Du Bois’s original stance triangle: along the stance subject–
stance object dimension, the act of evaluation is now represented with arrows pointing in both 
directions. The parentheses enclosing the arrow pointing from referent to subject/speaker are 
intended to indicate that the ability of the stance object to evaluate the subject is only imagined 
(but nonetheless consequential) at the moment the stance is taken. Other-oriented stances, those 
taken towards third persons, could be subsumed under the more general term of “interpersonal 
stance,” though that term is usually associated with stances taken towards addressees, e.g., 
Kiesling (2004) uses it to describe the casual solidarity achieved by the term dude. Other-
oriented stances are potentially more complex than addressee-oriented interpersonal stances 
because they involve all components of the stance triangle: evaluation of some referent, 
positioning with respect to both referent and addressee, and alignment or disalignment with 
addressee.  
Let us consider how the concept of other-oriented stance can help us analyze the most 
elaborate cases of avoidance—near-homophone avoidance. In the following two-line extract 
from an informal conversation, speaker B uses the form qaniiw instead of balool ‘speak.’ The 
verb qaniiw is an ordinary synonym of balool, meaning ‘talk,’ but is used far less frequently in 
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ordinary speech, and in that sense is a marked word form. It is a conventionalized avoidance 
alternative for balool. In line 1, a woman, A, asks her friend, B, who B’s daughter was speaking 
to, and B then replies that her daughter was speaking to her on her cell phone. 
 
Extract 1 
1 A g-óo-bàlóolí  ng’èa? 
  AFF-3-talk.IS  who 
  ‘Who was she talking to?’  
 
2  (0.2) 
 
3 B qw-á-qánìiw-àn  àbà jée sìimu 
  AFF-3-talk-1SG.OBJ  LOC  stomach phone 
  ‘She was talking to me on the phone’ 
 
In line 3, B avoids the word balool because it is understood to allude to the name Bálàwà, one of 
B’s in-law relations. By avoiding making allusive reference to Bálàwà and using the 
gíing’áwêakshòoda word qaniiw instead, B nonetheless makes Bálàwà a stance object in this 
moment, orienting to him as an allusive referent of the avoided word. In the conspicuous act of 
avoidance, she takes a deferential stance towards the target of avoidance. Bálàwà becomes the 
stance object by means of a complex inferential process: B’s use of the marked form qaniiw 
implies avoidance of balool, which in turn implies avoidance of a name beginning with bal. The 
addressee may or may not be able to retrieve the allusive referent, Bálàwà, but would at least 
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infer an instance of name avoidance, and thus an act of deference towards some in-law relation. 
In orienting to Bálàwà as someone deserving of name avoidance, B tends to her relationship with 
her affinal kin and positions herself as a dutiful daughter-in-law. 
 
4.1. Stances of deference, distance, and obligation  
I have repeatedly described the other-oriented stances accomplished through gíing’áwêakshòoda 
as deferential, and I now want to probe the quality of this stance a little further. That 
gíing’áwêakshòoda words are indexical of respect is obvious to Datooga speakers. Women and 
men frequently give a one-word answer to the question of why gíing’áwêakshòoda is practiced: 
múréeda ‘respect.’ In the following extract from an interview, an elderly woman (W) provides a 
slightly longer answer to this question but explains that avoidance is simply a matter of respect, 
the four repetitions of the word múréeda indicating its centrality in her understanding of 
avoidance. The interviewer (I) is a younger Datooga woman, the elderly woman’s neighbor.   
 
Extract 2 
4 W: níi  múr-ée-dá 
  DEM.PROX  respect-PS-UR 
  ‘This is respect’ 
 
5  (4.8) 
 
6 I: ah haa 
  ‘Ah ha’ 
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7 W: gíi-ng’áwêak-sh-òo-ní  há  múr-ée-dá  gìl  (íiyá)? 
  NMLZ-avoid-AP-PS-DEM.PROX  DSC respect-PS-UR thing mother 
  ‘This avoidance is respect, (dear)?’ 
 
8 I: múr-ée-dá  gíl  hà: 
  respect-PS-UR thing DSC 
  ‘It’s respect?’ 
 
9 W: éa  múr-ée-dá  (2.5)  gíi-ng’áwêak-sh-òo-ní  múr-ée-dá 
  yes  respect-PS-UR  NMLZ-avoid-AP-PS-DEM.PROX  respect-PS-UR 
  ‘Yes, respect … this avoidance is respect’ 
 
This strong metapragmatic association between gíing’áwêakshòoda and the concept of respect 
helps us characterize the kind of stance a woman takes towards an in-law by uttering a 
gíing’áwêakshòoda word. It is not the act of referring in itself that is disrespectful, but referring 
by means of a particular name—the birth name. As discussed earlier, one problematic 
association with using someone’s birth name is that it assumes senior or equal status to the 
referent. To conspicuously avoid this status indexing, as a woman does when she uses an 
enregistered avoidance word, is to imply the inverse, i.e., to assert one’s junior status, and thus 
emphasize the deference entitlements of the referent (Agha 1993) with respect to the speaker.  
In the following utterance, for example, a young woman uses the verb laaj ‘lend’ instead of 
shah ‘buy’ because the latter form sounds like the name of her father-in-law. In uttering laaj, she 
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projects her father-in-law as a stance object: he becomes relevant in the discourse as an allusive 
referent of the purposefully omitted word shah ‘buy’ and thus a conspicuous target of avoidance. 
Simultaneously, she indexes the deference entitlements of this stance object relative to herself 
through her linguistic dexterity in avoiding a word that would allude to his name. Avoidance 
words in their default use index a nonpresent ‘other’ as a focus of both avoidance and deference. 
 
(5) g-ée  (.) gíd-  (.)  bóo-ga  g-éa-láajá  hàad   
 AFF-1PL thing  maize-MR AFF-1PL-lend.IS how.much    
 ‘We – it – how much maize was sold?’ 
 
Deference is not the only quality of these avoidance-based stance-takings, however. Work on 
avoidance practices from other parts of the world highlights other aspects of relational meaning 
indexed by avoidance. Stasch (2003:329) describes in-law name avoidance among the Korowai 
of New Guinea as constructing “bonds of conjoined alterity and obligation,” where alterity is 
symbolized through numerous prohibitions on contact, and obligation is symbolized through the 
giving of gifts to one’s in-laws, as well as through upholding avoidance practices. Stasch’s ideas 
about alterity and obligation—or separateness and connectedness—can usefully inform the 
discussion of what kind of stance a Datooga woman takes when she avoids an in-law’s name. In 
avoiding another person’s birth name, the speaker indicates that she is not entitled to use it: not 
only does this index that person’s deference entitlements, but positions the speaker as socially 
removed and different from the stance object.15 On the other hand, the act of taking this 
appropriate stance towards someone—taking such care not to utter their name—emphasizes the 
obligation the stance subject has towards the stance object. A woman acknowledges her 
To appear in Journal of Linguistic Anthropology (accepted 28 April 2017)  
 23 
indebtedness and thus her connectedness to her relatives-in-law through repeated acts of 
avoidance. An instance of avoidance, such as that represented in (), is thus both a positive and a 
negative stance, indexing a relationship of separation and connection—or conjunction and 
disjunction, in Radcliffe-Brown’s (1965[1940]:91) terms. This particular other-oriented stance is 
associated, culture-internally, with respect and appropriateness, and through its reiteration, also 
bestows on women particular qualities of personhood, as I discuss in my concluding remarks. 
The obligatory nature of name avoidance—that women are expected to avoid in all contexts but 
childbirth—gives these stance-takings an unusual quality. Avoiding a name or a near-
homophone is not a spontaneous, dynamic interactional strategy for indexing deference, but an 
almost invariable aspect of married women’s speech. Avoidance-based other-oriented stances 
operate on a different level, then, to stances projected by more spontaneous choices in language 
use. In theory, a woman might criticize her father-in-law in the same utterance that she defers to 
him through name avoidance. Ways in which the obligatory presence of name avoidance in 
women’s speech cross-cuts with other kinds of context-dependent interactional work remains to 
be explored in detail, though the discussion of Extract 4 in the following section gives an 
example of what an avoidance word can achieve on the speaker-addressee interactional plane. 
 
4.2. Other foci of deference besides (allusive) referents 
While I claim that Datooga avoidance speech is primarily referent-focused, it has been suggested 
that similar name-based avoidance registers are examples of bystander honorifics, e.g., 
Posthumus (1991) on hlonipha in Zulu, and Irvine (2009:164), also discussing hlonipha, who 
suggests the term “remote focus” for more distant bystanders. The key idea here is that in the act 
of avoidance, women pay respect to overhearing ancestral spirits. For Datooga, linguistic 
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avoidance is undeniably partially motivated by metaphysical beliefs about links between the 
spiritual and the human world: Datooga women’s talk about avoidance often invokes the themes 
of fertility and child-bearing, domains believed to be influenced by the moods of the spirits 
(Blystad 2000).16 Women’s violation of the name taboos during a difficult labor, when they are 
encouraged to shout out the otherwise forbidden names of their in-laws, supports a view of 
ancestral spirits as overhearers—not, in these unique circumstances, targets of deference, but 
targets of offence. In this specific context of childbirth, these spectral overhearers in fact seem to 
take on the role of addressee: women are either calling on them for help, or attempting to enrage 
them.17 In more everyday contexts, women’s avoidance practices may be partly guided by an 
awareness of metaphysical listeners-in, but perhaps only in the sense of the much more general 
belief that a lack of respect (múréeda) in human behaviour will bring about misfortune (Blystad 
2000).  
Under certain circumstances, name avoidance may also target immediate, copresent 
addressees as a secondary focus of deference (Agha 2007:327). For example, if a woman avoids 
a word on account of an in-law relation who also happens to be addressee, this bestows respect 
upon the addressee in a similar, though less obvious, fashion to the use of an honorific second 
person pronoun in other languages. If a woman is talking to her father-in-law and avoids a word 
that sounds like the name of his brother, she pays him respect by association. For addressees or 
bystanders who do not count among or are not allied with a speaker’s in-laws, avoidance 
language may still defer to them in the sense that its use upholds social norms and ideals of 
appropriateness in verbal behavior. Consider the following extract, in which one speaker (A) 
reports hearing a woman utter the name of her father-in-law. Immediately prior to this extract, 
speaker A and two other women are discussing whether women who belong to the Iraqw ethnic 
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group (who frequently intermarry with Datooga) practice avoidance. A emphasises with a 
rhetorical question that they do not avoid and provides the example in line 10 as evidence of this:  
 
Extract 3 
10 A:  éa-ng’      g-àj-ák         g-óo-ng’áwêakshì néa  índéaréet-tà q-àa-íinyí 
  CONJ-who   AFF-FUT-SEQ AFF-3-avoid.AP CONJ  past.day-DEM.DIST AFF-1SG-hear.IS 
   gátm-òo-dá  bál-léan-dá  Gílléeng’  gw-á-yéeshà àkóo  Gílléeng’  
  wife-PS-UR boy-SNG-UR PSN AFF-3-say elder.male PSN 
“And how will they avoid? The other day I heard Gilleeng’s daughter-in-law say “akoo 
Gilleeng”’ 
11   (0.4)  
12  Dàtóogá néa  néa índéaréet-tà  sí-báspàschi  
  Datooga CONJ CONJ  past.day-DEM.DIST  1PL.PRF-be.ashamed 
  “Goodness me, that day we were ashamed”  
13  (0.3)  
14  ooh! 
  
In line 12, A reports that the daughter-in-law’s addressees (or perhaps bystanders; it’s unclear 
from the context what role A played in the interaction) were embarrassed and ashamed on 
hearing her utter her father-in-law’s name. A also expresses her shock with the exclamatory 
expression Dàtóogá in initial position in line 12, and another non-lexical exclamation “ooh!” in 
line 14. While this is only a report of a taboo violation—at no point in my recordings does 
anyone utter a taboo name, for comparison—it suggests that through observing avoidance, 
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speakers attend not only to their relationships with their affinal kin, but also to their interlocutors, 
in much the same way as euphemism saves all participants from potential embarrassment or 
distress.  
An additional example illustrates further complexity in how acts of avoidance or 
nonavoidance mediate relationships between copresent participants as well as between speakers 
and third parties. Extract 3 showed how a speaker might shock, and therefore disalign with, her 
addressee through a marked absence of avoidance. In Extract 4, a speaker disaligns with her 
addressee by using an avoidance word, but in the context of indirect metalinguistic correction. 
(Line 20 of Extract 4 has been discussed above as example (2), and is repeated here in its larger 
sequential context extracted from an interview.) My research assistant (I) has just asked how one 
avoids the word háwéega ‘girls,’ and the senior wife (S) replies to this question in line 15. After 
a reasonably long pause, the junior wife (J) points out the similarity between the word that her 
co-wife just uttered, múlèalga, and the name of a taboo in-law, Gídámúlda. (As co-wives, S and 
J avoid the same set of names.) My research assistant then asks whether the women avoid the 
word múlèalga, upon which the junior wife then repeats her point (phrased again as a negative 
question) that the word sounds like a taboo in-law’s name. In line 22, my research assistant 




15  S: gw-á-yíi  múlèal-ga 
  AFF-3-hear  girl-MR 
  ‘They say mulealga’ 
To appear in Journal of Linguistic Anthropology (accepted 28 April 2017)  
 27 
 
16  (7.6) 
 
17 J: àndà  g-í-nyáash-t-ánú  àdà m-òo-wíinyí  Gídáwápta  íiyá  néada? 
  Q  AFF-2SG-ask-CF-OBL.IS DSC NEG-3-smell.like.IS  PSN  mother NEG.Q 
  ‘Doesn’t what you just said sound like ‘Gidawapta’ [Gidamulda], mother?’ 
 
[Two lines omitted] 
 
18  I: múlèal-gá (.)  g-íi-ng’áwáasí? 
  girl-MR  AFF-2SG-avoid.IS 
  ‘Do you avoid mulealga?’ 
 
19  (1.2) 
 
20 J: m-òo-wíinyí  Gídáwápta íiyá? 
  NEG-3-smell.like.IS  PSN  mother  
  ‘Doesn’t it sound like Gidawapta, mother?’ 
 
21  (6.5) 
 
22 I: Gídáwápta Gídámúldéa? 
  PSN  PSN 
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  ‘Is Gidawapta Gidamulda?’ 
 
23 J: éa 
  ‘yes’ 
 
In referring to a senior male affine by the gíing’áwêakshòoda name Gídáwápta rather than by his 
birth name Gídámúldá, the speaker takes a stance towards this third party that is culture-
internally associated with affinal deference, as I have discussed. If we consider the sequential 
context of this utterance, we might argue that in using this particular person-referring expression, 
the stance-taking subject is also disaligning with a copresent subject, her senior co-wife. In line 
15, the senior wife provides the gíing’áwêakshòoda word múlèalga, a word that is a near-
homophone of the avoided name Gídámúldá (they share the same initial CVC sequence) and is 
thus technically taboo for the women of this household. (Since these women don’t avoid the 
word háwéega ‘girls,’ they would not under normal circumstances need to utter the word 
múlèalga; this avoidance form comes up only in the context of this interview.) In line 17, and 
then again in line 20, the junior wife points out that the word the senior wife has just uttered, 
múlèalga, is taboo. She softens her rebuke by using a negative question and referring to the 
addressee with the familiar kinship term ‘mother.’ Nonetheless, she disaligns with her addressee 
by calling the addressee’s behavior into question: in referring to Gídámúlda as Gídáwápta, the 
junior wife takes the expected deferential stance towards him, simultaneously highlighting the 
absence of deference in her co-wife’s previous turn. The long pause of nearly eight seconds 
between the senior wife’s utterance of múlèalga and the junior wife’s utterance in line 17 
suggests that what is achieved in line 17 is, in conversation analytic terms, a dispreferred action, 
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which supports the interpretation of this utterance as disaligned. While the senior wife does not 
respond verbally, in the long pause in line 21 she crosses her arms over her chest and looks in the 
opposite direction to the junior wife, in a posture of disaffiliation. Du Bois’s stance triangle 
allows us to get at the multiple indexical meanings of avoidance language here: in uttering the 
avoidance form Gídáwápta, the junior wife orients to this third person and reproduces his 
deference entitlements, while at the same time disaligning with her addressee through the 
implied distinction between Gídáwápta and múlèalga and their respective moral implications. In 
turn, this act momentarily upends the status asymmetry between senior and junior co-wives. 
When speakers take stances towards nonpresent others through their choices about how to 
refer to them, they not only attend to their relationship with those others, and potentially with 
interlocutors and overhearers, but they also invite judgements about what kind of person they 
are. I discuss this point briefly in my concluding remarks. 
 
5. Concluding remarks  
I have focused in this paper on how avoidance language positions women relative to nonpresent 
others. An additional way in which avoidance language mediates social relations is through the 
“figures of personhood” it conjures (Agha 2005). Like honorifics, avoidance words are not only 
associated with the act of giving respect but also with the status of being respectful; as Agha 
(2007:302) puts it, “the tendency to speak respectfully to others is stereotypically revalorized as 
an index of the respectability of self.” Through linguistic avoidance, and through continual other-
oriented stances of the kind described here, women project an image of themselves as respectful 
and respectable (and also feminine, since this strongly gendered linguistic practice is an index of 
womanhood). This dimension of avoidance language—the enregistered voice it indexes—is 
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crucial to the social-relational meaning of avoidance among Datooga. I note here that voicing 
effects as well as potential addressee-focused deference are all part of what a speaker might 
achieve in the act of avoidance, though I have singled out referent-focused deference as my main 
theme. Although these different strands of social meaning cannot be readily untangled in 
practice, I would argue that referent-focused deference is conceptually primary, and that 
positioning with respect to self and addressee results from other-oriented stance taking as 
diagrammed in Figure 2. By avoiding reference, or allusive reference, to a certain other’s birth 
name, a speaker takes a deferential stance towards that other, and in doing so positions herself in 
a recognized category of person—respectful women—as well as potentially aligning with her 
addressee by heeding conventions of appropriateness. Nonetheless, these potential indexical 
meanings arise out of a more basic act of a woman orienting to an in-law relation by 
conspicuously avoiding their name. 
What is striking about other-oriented stances as achieved through avoidance in Datooga is 
how linguistically far-reaching they are: an entire special vocabulary has arisen for the purposes 
of avoiding making reference or allusive reference to senior in-laws by their birth names. While 
other-oriented stances in most languages may not have such significant linguistic consequences, 
this stance category is relevant to all human talk. As mentioned at various points in this paper, 
reference to third persons always entails stance-taking (even in so-called “default person 
reference”; Enfield 2007), and is thus a rich topic for exploring how nonpresent others are made 
relevant in speech (e.g., papers in Enfield and Stivers 2007). Referent honorifics fall under this 
category of person reference, and could also be modeled in terms of other-oriented stances. 
Gossip as a communicative practice is by definition oriented towards third parties and often 
serves to align copresent participants relative to the subjects of the gossip (Thornborrow & 
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Morris 2004, Jaworski & Coupland 2005). Reported speech, which will generally be 
accompanied by some form of third-person reference, and often occurs in the context of gossip, 
is an additional linguistic environment in which other-oriented stance may be a useful stance 
category. These topics would all be worth exploring to consider further how speakers’ 
relationships with nonpresent others are attended to in discourse and thus how through language 
use, speakers project more complex constellations of social relations than those that hold only 
between copresent participants. 
 
                                                        
1 Datooga names typically refer to some circumstance of the child’s birth—in this case, the 
baby’s small size. 
2 Grammatical abbreviations used in this paper are as follows: 1 ‘first person’; 2 ‘second person’;  
3 ‘third person’;  AFF ‘affirmative’;  AP ‘antipassive’;  CF ‘centrifugal’;  CP ‘centripetal’;  CONJ 
‘conjunction’; COP ‘copular’;  DEM ‘demonstrative’;  DIST ‘distal’;  DSC ‘discourse marker’;  FEM 
‘feminine’;   FS ‘formative suffix’;  FUT ‘future’;  IMP ‘imperative’;  IS ‘inflectional suffix’;  LOC 
‘locative’; MR ‘multiple reference’;  NEG ‘negative’;  NMLZ ‘nominalizer’;  OBJ ‘object’; OBL 
‘oblique’; PRF ‘plural’; PL ‘plural’;  PRO ‘pronoun’; PROX ‘proximal’;  PS ‘primary suffix’;  PSN 
‘personal name’;  PST ‘past’;  Q ‘question marker’; SEQ ‘sequential’;  SG ‘singular’; SNG 
‘singulative’; TERM ‘terminal’;  UR ‘unit reference’. Tone marking is frequently omitted on word-
final vowels: before a pause these vowels are whispered and thus bear no tone. 
3 See Klima (1970: Chapter 6) for a description of Datooga marriage.  
7 In Datooga, this name is referred to as qêawúngá díibìga ‘children’s name,’ i.e., name used by 
children. I translate this as ‘domestic name’ rather than ‘children’s name’ given the potential 
confusion arising from the latter term. 
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8 In the name, the singular suffix -da is omitted, and only the root of the word ‘cow,’ dée, 
remains. 
9 Another piece of anecdotal evidence for speakers’ awareness of the lexical and semantic 
content of names, unrelated to avoidance, is wordplay involving people’s names. One speaker 
once mentioned in passing that someone could be named ‘diarrhoea’ on account of either the 
child or some other member of the family suffering from diarrhoea around the time of the child’s 
birth. If one wanted to antagonize such a person, one could modify the name slightly so that it 
meant “s/he who has diarrhoea right now.” 
10 An additional interpretation of why Datooga use the word ‘smell like’ to talk about word 
similarity has to do with ideas of pollution: ‘smell’ may point to the dirtiness and danger of using 
taboo words. See van Beek (1992) for a discussion of how the conceptual domain of smell is 
used to symbolize ideas about pollution and taboo among Kapsiki/Higi of Cameroon and 
Nigeria. 
11 While a shared CVC syllable of a word and a taboo name prompts avoidance of that word 
across Datooga communities, there are also more idiosyncratic choices within a given household 
about which near-homophones to avoid—see Author (2015) for more details. 
12 In our case, connections between signs are drawn based on fear of uttering a taboo word, 
where elsewhere they might be intended to be humorous, as in punning. 
13 As Storch (2005:335) has pointed out for other Nilotic languages, the word for ‘name’ 
(qêawúnga) in Datooga is inherently plural, reflecting the fact that people have multiple names. 
14 See Fleming & Lempert (2011) and articles in the same issue for more on this paradoxical 
aspect of avoidance. 
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15 This aspect of avoidance—how it positions speakers and referents in a relationship of 
difference—is privileged in Ball’s (2015) analysis of affinal name avoidance among Wauja of 
Brazil. Ball also thinks about avoidance in terms of stance, and in particular what he calls 
“alterity stances” (2015:360). Here, alterity, or separateness, is understood as one dimension of 
the other-oriented stances indexed by acts of avoidance. 
16 For example, failure to avoid is thought to cause problems in childbirth. Another reported 
consequence of taboo breaking is that a woman’s sacred leather skirt, associated with fertility, 
will catch fire.  
17 An elderly woman explained taboo violation during childbirth in terms of calling for help in a 
life-threatening situation, which is reportedly an acceptable thing to do because one has never 
uttered their names at any other time. In her ethnography, Blystad (2000:124) explains this 
aspect of Datooga childbirth as a means of angering the spirits, and describes other ways in 
which people present at the birth create a feverish atmosphere in order to speed up the delivery, 
e.g., crying, singing, removing the sacred leather dress of Datooga women. We could also 
explain taboo violations at the time of childbirth in functional terms of pain-reduction: linguistic 
transgression of referring to one’s in-laws by name may offer relief at a desperate moment, much 
like swearing. See Stephens and Umland (2011) and references therein for evidence of the pain-
reducing effects of swearing. 
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Table 1: Examples of avoidance words 
DATOOGA MEANING gíing’áwêakshòoda SOURCE 
béega ‘water’ gárbàbánga derived from gárbàbu ‘cold’ 
daah ‘see’ ng’wear ordinary language: ‘look’ 
mánàng’ ‘small’ básàk unknown 
mànánda  ‘waist’ bùgústa ordinary language: ‘middle’ 
qáráat ‘hot’ sháng’shàng’ ordinary language: ‘warm’ 
sídàgèeda ‘needle’ sìndáan from Swahili sindano ‘needle’ 
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Figure 2 
 
 
